Economic Theory Seminar | Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences, Onur Kesten
Monday 31 May 2021, 4.00pm – 5.00pm via Zoom
Meeting ID: 840 2800 0771
Password: 555488
Abstract
In 56 developing and developed countries, blood component donations by volunteer non-remunerated donors can only meet less than 50% of the demand. In these countries, blood banks heavily rely on replacement donor programs that provide blood to patients in return for donations made by their close relatives or friends. These programs appear to be disorganized, non-transparent, and inefficient. We introduce the design of replacement donor programs and blood allocation schemes as a new application of market design. We formulate a general blood allocation and replacement donation model. Within this framework, we introduce optimal blood allocation mechanisms that accommodate fairness, efficiency, and other allocation objectives together with endogenous exchange rates between received and donated blood units beyond the classical one-for-one exchange. They also provide correct incentives for the patients to bring forward as many replacement donors as possible. This framework and the mechanism class also apply to general applications of multi-unit exchange for indivisible goods with compatibility-based preferences beyond blood allocation.
About the Speaker
Onur Kesten received his PhD in economics from the University of Rochester in 2005 and completed his post-doctorate at Harvard University in 2006 under the supervision of Nobel Laureate Alvin Roth. He is the recipient of the BP Junior Faculty Chair, Faculty Giving Chairs and won Richard Cyert Teaching award as well as the Lave-Weil prizes at Carnegie Mellon.His research focuses on market design and game theory. He has studied high schools and college admissions systems in the United States, China, Turkey, Sweden, Ukraine, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. His research was published in journals such as Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Theoretical Economics, and Journal of Economic Theory. He serves as the Editor-in-Chief of journal of Review of Economic Design and has served as Associate Editor at various other journals such as the Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences and Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design.
Onur Kesten received his PhD in economics from the University of Rochester in 2005 and completed his post-doctorate at Harvard University in 2006 under the supervision of Nobel Laureate Alvin Roth. He is the recipient of the BP Junior Faculty Chair, Faculty Giving Chairs and won Richard Cyert Teaching award as well as the Lave-Weil prizes at Carnegie Mellon.His research focuses on market design and game theory. He has studied high schools and college admissions systems in the United States, China, Turkey, Sweden, Ukraine, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. His research was published in journals such as Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Theoretical Economics, and Journal of Economic Theory. He serves as the Editor-in-Chief of journal of Review of Economic Design and has served as Associate Editor at various other journals such as the Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences and Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design.
Onur Kesten received his PhD in economics from the University of Rochester in 2005 and completed his post-doctorate at Harvard University in 2006 under the supervision of Nobel Laureate Alvin Roth. He is the recipient of the BP Junior Faculty Chair, Faculty Giving Chairs and won Richard Cyert Teaching award as well as the Lave-Weil prizes at Carnegie Mellon. His research focuses on market design and game theory. He has studied high schools and college admissions systems in the United States, China, Turkey, Sweden, Ukraine, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. His research was published in journals such as Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Theoretical Economics, and Journal of Economic Theory. He serves as the Editor-in-Chief of journal of Review of Economic Design and has served as Associate Editor at various other journals such as the Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences and Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design.
For further information contact:
Economic Theory Seminar Coordinator
Mert Kimya | ph: 8627 9631 |email: mert.kimya@sydney.edu.au
Mengke Wang | ph: 8627 9396 |email: mengke.wang@sydney.edu.au
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