HDR Seminar: Pengzhi Xia (University of Sydney) – School of Economics HDR Seminar: Pengzhi Xia (University of Sydney) – School of Economics

HDR Seminar: Pengzhi Xia (University of Sydney)

The School of Economics invites you to a HDR seminar by Pengzhi Xia (University of Sydney).

Political Job Assignments and Incentives

 

Abstract

Political job assignments are widely used by the Chinese government in managing state-owned enterprises.  This is where an upper level manager of a state-owned firm is assigned to a political role outside the organization. I develop a principal-agent model with multiple tasks and two jobs (an inside job and an outside political job) to explain this phenomenon. External political assignments yield a private benefit to the worker from career concerns but entail a loss in specific human capital. Using this framework, I develop a number of testable implications on the optimal use of these job assignments and the level of monetary incentives associated with them.

Date

Sep 23 2019
Expired!

Time

3:00 pm - 4:00 pm

Location

Room 650, Social Sciences Building (A02)
Category

Organizer

Dave Mc Manamon
Phone
93514587
Email
dave.mcmanamon@sydney.edu.au

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