Microeconomics Theory | I’ll Pay You Later: Backloading to Sustain Opportunistic Relationships by Marta Troya Martinez
School of Economics
Invites you to a
Microeconomics Theory seminar presented by
(New Economic School)
I’ll Pay You Later:
Backloading to Sustain Opportunistic Relationships
Co-authors:
Elena Paltseva (Stockholm School of Economics)
Gerhard Toews (New Economic School)
Monday 26 June
4.00pm – 5.00pm
Level 6 Seminar Room (650)
A02 Social Sciences Building
Camperdown Campus
The University of Sydney NSW 2006
Zoom: 84127177928
Passcode: 225361
In 1967, a decline in the use of military interventions by major world
powers undermined international contract enforcement and increased the
expropriation risk in many developing countries. Using data from the oil
and gas industry, we document that this change caused backloading – a delay
in investment, production and taxation – just as predicted by the theory of
self-enforcing agreements. The delay peaked at five years right after 1967
and vanished as the firm-government relationship matured.
For further information contact: Microeconomics Theory seminar series coordinators Dr Mengke Wang (mengke.wang@sydney.edu.au) & Dr Mert Kimya (mert.kimya@sydney.edu.au)
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