Microeconomics Theory seminar | Expropriation Power in Private Dealings: Quota Rule in Collective Sales by Duygu Yengin
Invites you to a
Microeconomics Theory seminar presented by
Duygu Yengin
(The University of Adelaide)
Expropriation Power in Private Dealings:
Quota Rule in Collective Sales
Tuesday 16 May 2023
3.00pm – 4.00pm
Seminar Room 650
A02 Social Sciences Building
Camperdown Campus
The University of Sydney NSW 2006
Zoom: 885 5914 9488
Complementarity is common in land-assembly problems, such as a developer buying the entirety of apartment units to complete a development project. Holdout (delay or block of projects by sellers) is common in these problems under unanimity-rule. Motivated by the recent policy practices in strata-sales, we introduce a new bargaining model with quota-rule. We show that under quota-rule, there is no holdout when there are two sellers or players are sufficiently patient. No-holdout equilibrium is unique, efficient and yields immediate sale of all goods as outcome. When quota rule is used, efficient equilibrium is still obtained under alternative bargaining protocols and with multiple sellers. We also show that the no-holdout result is not due to the specific bargaining protocol.
For further information contact: Microeconomics Theory seminar series coordinators Dr Mengke Wang (mengke.wang@sydney.edu.au) & Dr Mert Kimya (mert.kimya@sydney.edu.au)
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