Invites you to a

Microeconomics Theory seminar presented by

Duygu Yengin
(The University of Adelaide)

Expropriation Power in Private Dealings:
Quota Rule in Collective Sales 

Tuesday 16 May 2023
3.00pm – 4.00pm 

Seminar Room 650

A02 Social Sciences Building
Camperdown Campus

The University of Sydney NSW 2006 

Zoom: 885 5914 9488

Complementarity is common in land-assembly problems, such as a developer buying the entirety of apartment units to complete a development project. Holdout (delay or block of projects by sellers) is common in these problems under unanimity-rule.  Motivated by the recent policy practices in strata-sales, we introduce a new bargaining model with quota-rule. We show that under quota-rule, there is no holdout when there are two sellers or players are sufficiently patient. No-holdout equilibrium is unique, efficient and yields immediate sale of all goods as outcome. When quota rule is used, efficient equilibrium is still obtained under alternative bargaining protocols and with multiple sellers. We also show that the no-holdout result is not due to the specific bargaining protocol.

For further information contact: Microeconomics Theory seminar series coordinators Dr Mengke Wang (mengke.wang@sydney.edu.au) & Dr Mert Kimya (mert.kimya@sydney.edu.au)

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