Invites you to a

Microeconomics Theory seminar presented by

Vladimir Smirnov

(University of Sydney)

Choosing the prize in contests

Tuesday 20 September

4.00pm – 5.00pm 

Via Zoom: Meeting Link

Abstract: In many contests, a participant’s choices can influence the value of the prize on offer. How-ever, in the standard contest model, the value of the prize is exogenous and participants have discretion only over the effort they exert. This paper proposes a new type of N -player contest in which each participant chooses both her own prize and effort. We present a general model and establish sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence. We then de-scribe sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibria, and discuss comparative statics with respect to the number of players. Finally, we discuss asymmetric contests.

For further information contact: Microeconomics Theory seminar series coordinators Dr Mengke Wang (mengke.wang@sydney.edu.au) & Dr Mert Kimya (mert.kimya@sydney.edu.au)

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