Microeconomics Theory Seminar Series | Learning and equilibrium in misspecified models by Jonny Newton – School of Economics Microeconomics Theory Seminar Series | Learning and equilibrium in misspecified models by Jonny Newton – School of Economics

Microeconomics Theory Seminar Series | Learning and equilibrium in misspecified models by Jonny Newton

Invites you to a

Microeconomics Theory seminar presented by

Jonny Newton

(Kyoto University)

Learning and equilibrium in misspecified models

 

Tuesday 13 September

4.00pm – 5.00pm

Via Zoom: Meeting Link

Abstract: We consider learning in games that are misspecified in that players are unable to learn the true probability distribution over outcomes. Under misspecification, Bayes rule might not converge to the model that leads to actions with the highest objective payoff among the models subjectively admitted by the player. From an evolutionary perspective, this renders a population of Bayesians vulnerable to invasion. Drawing on the machine learning literature, we show that learning rules that outperform Bayes’ rule suggest a new solution concept for misspecified games: misspecified Nash equilibrium.

For further information contact: Microeconomics Theory seminar series coordinators Dr Mengke Wang (mengke.wang@sydney.edu.au) & Dr Mert Kimya (mert.kimya@sydney.edu.au)

For all upcoming seminars in School of Economics see Our events and Calendar

Date

Sep 13 2022
Expired!

Time

4:00 pm - 5:00 pm

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