
School Seminar series | Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model by Ashley Craig
Invites you to a
School seminar presented by
(University of Michigan)
Tax Knowledge and Tax Manipulation: A Unifying Model
Co-author:
Joel Slemrod (University of Michigan)
Thursday 10 November
11.00am – 12.30pm
Via Zoom: Meeting Link
Abstract: We provide a unified analysis of taxation and taxpayer education when individuals have an incomplete understanding of a complex tax system. The analysis is independent of whether income is earned legitimately, or by avoiding or evading taxes. In this sense, learning about tax minimization strategies (tax manipulation) is isomorphic to learning about the tax code. The government in our model balances a trade-off: A better understanding of the tax system potentially allows taxpayers to optimize more effectively, but also affects government revenue. Optimal taxpayer education and the optimal amount of redistribution can both be characterized by aggregate sufficient statistics that do not require information about how biases or behavioral responses vary across the decision margins.
For further information contact: School seminar series coordinators Dr Ye Lu (ye.lu1@sydney.edu.au) & Dr Alastair Fraser (alastair.fraser@sydney.edu.au)
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